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Keatan Williams 
 
  In an ongoing dispute, the Supreme Court has allowed retail natural gas 
purchasers to bring state law anti-trust claims against natural gas pipelines for 
price manipulation. While holding that the Natural Gas Act does not create field 
pre-emption over these claims, the opinion hinted that there might still be conflict 
pre-emption. Justice Scalia, in his dissent, argued forcefully that the majority had 
misapplied and misconstrued the applicable case law, which, he argued, clearly 
created field pre-emption. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
  At issue in Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc. was whether state anti-trust 
claims, brought by a group of manufacturers, hospitals, and others (“Buyers”) 
against interstate pipelines (“Pipelines”), were pre-empted by the Natural Gas 
Act when the actions alleged in the suit affected both wholesale and retail gas 
prices.1 The Buyers alleged that the Pipelines manipulated the price index of 
natural gas under state anti-trust law.2 The Buyers, as retail purchasers of natural 
gas, alleged that they overpaid for natural gas due to the Pipeline’s manipulation 
of the natural gas price indices.3 The Pipelines asserted that the Buyer’s price 
manipulation claims were pre-empted by the Natural Gas Act because they 
operated interstate pipelines.4 The Supreme Court of the United States held that 
the Natural Gas Act did not pre-empt state anti-trust claims because state laws 
were aimed at a broad field of anti-trust enforcement and not specifically at 
natural gas regulation.5 The dissent argued that the majority poorly misconstrued 
precedent.6 The Court did leave the door open, however, for conflict pre-emption 
claims.7 
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
  The Natural Gas Act was enacted to regulate the interstate shipment and 
sale of gas to local distributers for sale.8 The act granted the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) (formerly the Federal Power Commission 
(“FPC”)) rate-setting authority in the natural gas industry.9 Originally, the market 
was divided in to three sections: pumping gas; shipping and selling gas to retail 
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sellers; and purchasing gas by users.10 Since 1992, the FERC has relied on a 
competitive marketplace approach to determine rates. 11  The FERC generally 
determines if a jurisdictional seller lacks market power and, if so, issues a blanket 
certificate that allows the seller to charge market-based rates for gas.12 Within 
this system, many large gas consumers began purchasing directly from gas 
suppliers instead of from resellers.13  
In 2003, the FERC found that a number of gas suppliers were falsely 
reporting to price indices by “‘inflating the volume of trades, omitting trades, and 
adjusting the price of trades.’” 14  In response, the FERC revoked numerous 
blanket market certificates, issued a policy statement setting standards for price 
reporting, and issued a Code of Conduct prohibiting actions that did not have a 
legitimate business purpose.15 Additionally, Congress passed the Energy Policy 
Act of 2005, giving the FERC further authority in regulating the manipulation of 
the price indices.16  
  The Buyers were a number of businesses that purchased large quantities 
of natural gas directly from interstate pipelines for their own use.17 The Buyers 
brought numerous state-law antitrust suits in both state and federal courts against 
the Pipelines.18 The Pipelines removed the cases to the United States District 
Court for the District of Nevada, where they were consolidated.19 The district 
court granted summary judgment for the Pipelines on the basis that the Pipelines 
were “jurisdiction sellers.”20 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit reversed this decision. 21  The Ninth Circuit held that the price 
manipulation affected both wholesale—jurisdictional—and retail—non-
jurisdictional—sales, so state law claims were not pre-empted.22 The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari in order to resolve confusion in the lower courts.23 
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III. ANALYSIS 
 
  The Pipelines argued at the Supreme Court that state anti-trust lawsuits 
are within the field that the Natural Gas Act pre-empts because the lawsuits 
targeted activities that affected both wholesale and retail prices.24 The Pipelines 
argued that because the FERC has authority to regulate wholesale prices and the 
FERC has prohibited the type of activities the lawsuits target the, lawsuits were 
pre-empted. 25  The Pipelines also argued that the lawsuits would allow state 
courts to reach different conclusions than the FERC about the same activities.26  
The Supreme Court rejected these arguments, stating that the Natural 
Gas Act “‘was drawn with meticulous regard for the continued exercise of state 
power, not to handicap or dilute it in any way.’”27 The Court went on to state that 
precedent “emphasize[s] the importance of considering the target at which the 
state law aims in determining whether that law is pre-empted.”28 To support this 
conclusion, the Court pointed to precedent that considers the “‘significant 
distinction’” in gas law pre-emption to be between “‘measures aimed directly at 
interstate purchasers and wholesale for resale, and those aimed at’ subjects left to 
the States [sic] to regulate.”29 The Court contrasted this precedent with Northern 
Natural Gas Co. v. State Corporation Commission of Kansas, where pre-emption 
was found because the state laws were “‘unmistakably and unambiguously 
directed at purchasers.’”30 
  The Pipelines presented Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co. as contrary 
authority to the conclusion in Northern Natural.31 In Schneidewind, the Court 
held that a state law requiring public utilities to obtain state approval before 
issuing long-tern securities was pre-empted by the Natural Gas Act.32  In the 
present case, the Court rejected this argument, again focusing on what the state 
laws intend to regulate.33 The Court distinguished the present case because the 
state laws at issue in Schneidewind were specifically aimed at controlling the 
rates and facilities of natural gas companies.34  
  The Pipelines also focused on the need for a “clear division between 
areas of state and federal authority in natural-gas regulation.”35 The Court stated 
that this need is an ideal and does not reflect how natural gas regulation works in 
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the real world. 36  The Pipelines additionally presented two other cases they 
believed showed the FERC’s authority to regulate activities that have 
consequences on retail sales.37 The Court rejected both of these arguments.38  
In Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, the Court held that the 
Federal Power Act pre-empted state inquiries in to electricity prices previously 
approved by the FERC.39 The Pipelines argued that this case upheld pre-emption 
of state regulations similar to the regulations in the current case.40 The Court held 
that Mississippi Power was a conflict pre-emption issue and was not applicable to 
the current case. 41  The Court further distinguished the current case, again 
focusing on what the state laws aimed to regulate, instead of the activities they 
actually regulated. The Court held that the pre-empted laws in Mississippi Power 
were specifically directed at jurisdictional sales of natural gas, unlike the current 
case.42 
  The Pipelines also argued that Federal Power Commission v. Louisiana 
Power & Light Co. was controlling.43 In Louisiana Power, the Court held that the 
FPC had the authority to order interstate pipelines to “curtail gas deliveries to all 
customers, including retail customers.”44 The Pipelines argued that Louisiana 
Power showed that the FERC has the authority to regulate index manipulation, 
including how it affects retail prices.45 The Court distinguished Louisiana Power 
as another conflict pre-emption case and determined it was not precedential in the 
current case.46  The Court did focus on the possibility of future conflict pre-
emption claims, however, but left them “for the lower courts to resolve.”47  
Lastly, the Court refused to defer to the FERC’s determination that field 
pre-emption bared the Buyer’s claims.48 The Court stated that no such previous 
determination existed, and even if one did exist, it would not “offset the other 
considerations that weigh against a finding of pre-emption in this context.”49 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
  By holding against field pre-emption, the Court has allowed, for now, 
companies who purchase retail gas from interstate pipelines to bring state law 
anti-trust claims against interstate pipeline operators. The Court affirmed the rule 
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of focusing on what a state law aims to regulate in determining pre-emption 
cases. The Court refused to determine whether or not conflict pre-emption 
existed because neither party briefed the issue. This case potentially exposes 
interstate pipelines that sell directly to customers to further liability. These 
implications may have future affects on how the natural gas market develops in 
the United States. The dissent is notable because it suggested that a clear line be 
drawn between federal and state regulation in natural gas law.50  The dissent 
argued that once federal regulation has been applied to an act, all state laws 
should be pre-empted from applying to that act.51 The majority trumped this 
argument, holding that the aim of the state laws was more important than the 
actual activity that the laws were regulating. 52  This case lends itself to a 
narrower, rather than broader, reading of state pre-emption in the context of 
natural gas law.  
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